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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge 
 
This appeal by the State of New Jersey from a judgment 
of the district court granting Harold Love's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
petition for writ of habeas corpus requires us to decide 
whether the court properly ruled that Petitioner had been 
placed in former jeopardy prior to his trial and conviction 
for robbery in state court. 
 
Love defended in two state court trials on charges of 
robbery and armed robbery. At the close of testimony on 
the first day of his first trial, the trial judge declared a 
mistrial for personal reasons. The next day, a second trial 
began before another judge and a second jury. The new 
trial judge denied Love's motion to dismiss the indictment 
on grounds of double jeopardy. Following his conviction 
and sentencing, Love unsuccessfully appealed to the state 
appellate court on the double jeopardy issue. State v. Love, 
282 N.J. Super. 590, 660 A.2d 1246 (App. Div. 1995) (per 
curiam). Love then filed a habeas corpus petition in district 
court. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court ruled that Love's first trial was terminated without his 
consent and without manifest necessity. The court granted 
Love's petition on the basis of double jeopardy. Love v. 
Morton, 944 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.J. 1996). The State of New 
Jersey has appealed. 
 
At stake here are protections assured by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides: 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." As the 
Supreme Court teaches: 
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The constitutional protection against "double 
jeopardy" was designed to protect an individual from 
being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible 
conviction more than once for an alleged offense. In his 
Commentaries, which greatly influenced the generation 
that adopted the Constitution, Blackstone recorded: 
 
". . . the plea of auterfoits acquit, or a former 
acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the 
common law of England, that no man is to be 
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for 
the same offence." 
 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (citing 4 
William Blackstone, Commentaries 335). 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause not only ensures the finality 
of criminal judgments, but also protects a defendant's 
"valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) 
(quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971)). 
As urged by New Jersey, however, this "valued right . . . 
must in some instances be subordinated to the public's 
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." 
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has crafted certain exceptions to the literal 
language of the Clause. New Jersey presented two of these 
exceptions to the district court and urges them upon us 
here. 
 
Mistrials declared with the defendants' consent do not 
bar a later prosecution. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 
600, 607 (1976). Even without their consent, defendants 
may be retried when, "taking all the circumstances into 
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the 
[mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be 
defeated."1 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. New Jersey relies on "manifest necessity" because the phrase "ends of 
public justice" is not applicable to the facts of this case. See Illinois v. 
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-471 (1973) (holding that the ends of public 
justice justify a mistrial where the trial contains a defect such that a 
conviction, if obtained, could be upset at will on appeal or in collateral 
proceedings). 
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580 (1824) (Justice Story coining the phrase "manifest 
necessity"). Our task is to decide whether there was 
manifest necessity for declaring the mistrial and whether 
Petitioner expressly or impliedly consented to the mistrial. 
New Jersey also argues that the court erred in conducting 
an evidentiary hearing in the § 2254 proceeding. The 
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The appeal was 
timely filed under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
 
Where a district court holds an evidentiary hearing in a 
habeas proceeding, this court reviews the district court's 
findings of fact for clear error. Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 
44, 50-51 (3d Cir. 1989). We exercise plenary review over 
the district court's legal conclusions. Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 




Love stood trial in the Atlantic County, New Jersey 
Superior Court in two trials before two juries on charges of 
robbery and armed robbery. The first jury was sworn and 
testimony began on the morning of June 15, 1993. During 
the testimony of the State's fourth witness, the jury was 
excused so that counsel could argue an issue relating to 
"chain of custody." Counsel and the trial judge, James 
Citta, repaired to chambers to discuss the matter. At about 
3:30 p.m., the judge received a telephone call from his wife, 
who was exceedingly upset because her mother had died 
unexpectedly. The judge later testified that he was close to 
his mother-in-law and was upset not only at her untimely 
passing, but also at his inability to be immediately available 
to comfort his wife. The prosecuting attorney testified that 
Judge Citta was "very upset" and "visibly shaken." Judge 
Citta called the presiding criminal judge, Judge 
Braithwaite, and briefly discussed the situation. 
 
The prosecutor has described the events that took place 
in Judge Citta's chambers after the call from the judge's 
wife: 
 
We waited for him to get off the telephone, and he 
explained to us that, as I indicated, his wife was very 
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distraught that her--her mother had died suddenly 
and unexpectedly and she had been unable to reach 
anyone. He further indicated that he was an hour away 
from home and that he had to leave. He had to get out 
of here and go home and so forth, and it was apparent 
there was stress on his face and in his demeanor and 
his voice and so forth that he--there was an urgency to 
his need to leave the courthouse. He said that `I don't 
know what I'm going to do about this case. I don't 
know if we'll mistry it or not. I'm not sure what the 
procedure should be. I'm going to call Judge 
Braithwaite,['] which is what he did. He phoned Judge 
Braithwaite in our presence. He discussed the situation 
with Judge Braithwaite including the fact of the State's 
witnesses having just arrived from Canada yesterday 
afternoon and then--that there being some wish on the 
part of the State that the case proceed, whether that 
could be effected through the assignment of another 
judge to pick up the case from that point on or to start 
the case anew, whatever; but he discussed the matter 
with Judge Braithwaite; and after he got off the 
telephone, he advised us that he was going to mistry 
the case. Now, needless to say, counsel and I in that 
position were in the situation where we both had an 
interest in the case proceeding from that point on, but 
neither of us was in a situation where we could tell 
Judge Citta `Forget your wife and forget your mother- 
in-law's death. Let's get on with this trial.' I mean there 
was an urgency and an emergent situation here that 
none of us had previously encountered. 
 
State v. Love, 660 A.2d at 1248-1249. 
 
Judge Citta testified at the evidentiary hearing in the 
district court that he did not remember asking counsel for 
their input or consent to the mistrial: 
 
I do not recall asking either counsel if they consented 
to a mistrial. I'm not the sort of judge that asked for 
permission or asked for consent. Generally in 
situations like this when I have made a decision--and 
the decision had been made--and my recollection is 
that I informed them that this is what I was going to do 
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and to please go in the courtroom and get the jury in 
there as quickly as possible. 
 
Love v. Morton, 944 F. Supp. at 381 n.3. 7 
 
After his conversation with Judge Braithwaite, Judge 
Citta notified counsel that he would declare a mistrial, and 
counsel returned to the courtroom. Defense counsel later 
testified that the time between his return to the courtroom 
and the judge's return was "five to ten minutes at the 
most." Judge Citta addressed the jury: 
 
Ladies and gentleman, I am going to declare a mistrial 
in this case. It has nothing to do with either of the 
litigants, their--the attorneys or the defendant or you. 
I just received a phone call that my mother-in-law 
passed away this afternoon, and I have some things I 
must attend to as a result of that, and I will not be 
available for the rest of this week. Due to the 
scheduling problems--normally what I would do is I 
would continue the case and dismiss you for the 
balance of this week and have you come back next 
week and we would finish it, but due to some 
scheduling problems that obviously could not be 
anticipated and the difficulty that it causes for various 
witnesses in the case, I'm going to declare a mistrial. 
 
State v. Love, 660 A.2d at 1248. After declaring the mistrial, 
Judge Citta immediately returned to his chambers. He left 
the courthouse shortly thereafter. The prosecutor gave 
fifteen minutes as a "ballpark estimate" of the time that 
expired between the call from Judge Citta's wife and the 
time Judge Citta left the courtroom. 
 
At the time Judge Citta declared the mistrial, another 
judge, Judge Alvarez, was available to complete the trial. In 
fact, Judge Alvarez had been a spectator in the courtroom 
during some of the day's proceedings. Nevertheless, Judge 
Braithwaite instructed counsel to return the following 
morning to pick a new jury. Later that afternoon, Judge 
Braithwaite assigned Judge Alvarez to begin a new trial in 
the morning. 
 
When asked during the district court hearing whether he 
had considered prior to declaring a mistrial that "there 
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might be double jeopardy problems," Judge Citta replied: 
"Never crossed my mind, no." Apparently no one else 
involved in this case considered the possibility of double 
jeopardy until defense counsel returned to his office and 
began discussing the case with his colleagues. At that point 
he began to realize the potential implications of the 
mistrial. The following morning, defense counsel asked 
Judge Alvarez to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy 
grounds. Judge Alvarez denied the motion, the trial 
proceeded, and Love was convicted and sentenced to 30 
years. 
 
Love appealed to the Superior Court Appellate Division, 
arguing that his conviction was invalid because his second 
trial violated double jeopardy principles. State v. Love, 660 
A.2d at 1247. In affirming Love's conviction, the Appellate 
Division emphasized that Love's mistrial was not the result 
of bad faith or improper motive on the part of the trial 
judge or the prosecuting attorney. Id. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Love, 142 N.J. 
572, 667 A.2d 189 (1995). 
 
The district court proceedings followed. After examining 
the record and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court 
determined that Love's conviction was invalid. The court 
found that the mistrial was not required by manifest 
necessity, and that defense counsel's failure to object did 
not constitute implied consent. The court granted Love's 
petition for habeas relief, but stayed issuance of the writ 




Before addressing the double jeopardy issue, we will 
consider whether it was proper for the district court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. New Jersey suggests that 
an evidentiary hearing was improper in light of the recent 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 amendments included in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996). Section 
2254(e)(2) now provides: 
 
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis 
of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall 
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not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the 
applicant shows that-- 
 
(A) the claim relies on-- 
 
 (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; 
or 
 
 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 
previously discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence; and 
 
(B) the facts of the claim would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but 
for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder 
would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
 
Love filed his § 2254 petition on December 5, 1995. 
Congress enacted the amendments on April 24, 1996. As 
we stated in Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 
1996), "we need not digress to determine the effect of [the 
1996 amendments] on the present action, filed, as it was, 
before the amendments were enacted." See also Boria v. 
Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(because the death penalty sections contain an explicitly 
retroactive provision and the other sections do not, 
Congress intended the latter to have only prospective 
effect). But see Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 
1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 726 (1997). 
 
Even if we were to give retroactive effect to the 1996 
amendments to § 2254, we would not conclude that the 
district court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing.2 
Section 2254(e)(2) applies to applicants who "failed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court, without discussion, also concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing would be appropriate under the 1996 amendments: 
"Adopting the majority view on retroactivity, the Court need not revisit 
its decision to order an evidentiary hearing beyond noting that the Court 
would have ordered an evidentiary hearing under the new 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(2) as well." 944 F. Supp. at 381 n.1. 
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develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 
proceedings." In this case, Love did not "fail" to develop the 
basis of his claim. 
 
Judge Citta's abrupt declaration of a mistrial made it 
impossible for Love to develop the record at the time of the 
mistrial. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecuting 
attorney was given the time or opportunity to comment on 
the mistrial decision or to suggest that the decision be 
delayed until the next morning. In the words of the 
prosecutor: "I mean there was an urgency and an emergent 
situation here that none of us had previously encountered." 
Following the judge's decision to declare a mistrial, the 
attorneys were ordered to return to the courtroom for the 
sole purpose of the court's notification to the jury that the 
trial was aborted. Under these circumstances, we conclude 
that Love was unable to develop the basis of his claim at 
trial. 
 
The following morning, Love's counsel moved to dismiss 
the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Defense 
counsel and the prosecutor gave narrative accounts of the 
events of the previous afternoon and the trial court deemed 
these accounts to be a satisfactory basis for denying the 
motion, thus ending the double jeopardy matter at the trial 
level. Love was unable to fully develop the factual basis of 
his claim at that time because of Judge Citta's 
unavailability. Love had no opportunity at that point to 
inquire, as he later did in the federal hearing, into the 
judge's consideration of the available alternatives to a 
mistrial. 
 
Similarly, we conclude that Love was unable to develop 
the basis of his claim in state court post-conviction 
proceedings. In New Jersey "an issue may not be 
considered in post-conviction relief proceedings if the 
question was decided on direct appeal." State v. Bontempo, 
170 N.J. Super. 220, 233, 406 A.2d 203 (1979) (citing State 
v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 592, 206 A.2d 737 (1965)); see 
N.J. Cr. R. 3:22-5 Bar of Ground Expressly Adjudicated. 
After the Appellate Division affirmed Love's conviction on 
the basis of the limited trial court record, Love could not 
raise the double jeopardy issue and present additional 
evidence in a post-conviction proceeding. 
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Under these circumstances we are unwilling to conclude 
that Love failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in 
the state court proceedings. We conclude that factors other 
than the defendant's action prevented a factual record from 
being developed. See Statement by President William J. 
Clinton Upon Signing S. 1965, 32 Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents 719 (April 29, 1996) (#AB AD8E# 2254(e)(2)] 
is not triggered when some factor that is not fairly 
attributable to the applicant prevented evidence from being 
developed in State court."). Although the President's 
statement is not evidence of congressional intent, we refer 
to it because we agree with his interpretation of the plain 
language of § 2254(e)(2), and we find no contrary 
interpretation in the legislative history of the 1996 




Jeopardy attached when the first jury was empaneled 
and sworn. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-38 (1978). 
Termination of proceedings after jeopardy attaches, without 
defendant's consent by motion or otherwise, may bar 
reprosecution. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
Our jurisprudence does not prohibit retrial following 
termination if a defendant consents or waives the right to 
assert double jeopardy, or when there is manifest necessity 
to terminate the first trial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
667, 673 (1982); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 
(1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); Illinois 
v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). 
 
We now consider whether the mistrial was required by 
manifest necessity. To demonstrate manifest necessity, the 
state must show that under the circumstances the trial 
judge "had no alternative to the declaration of a mistrial." 
United States v. McKoy, 591 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1979). 
The trial judge must consider and exhaust all other 
possibilities. Id. 
 
Love argues that the court failed to exhaust the 
possibilities of (1) excusing the jury overnight so the parties 
could explore the option of continuing the trial with the 
same jury and a different judge; and (2) continuing the trial 
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with Judge Alvarez and the same jury the next day, or as 
soon as Judge Alvarez could familiarize herself with the 
trial transcript. 
 
Love explains that the New Jersey Rules of Court provide 
for the substitution of judges in situations such as this. 
Rule 1:12-3(b) provides that upon the disability of a judge 
during trial: 
 
another judge may be designated to complete the trial 
as if having presided from its commencement, 
provided, however, that the substituted judge is able to 
become familiar with the proceedings and all of the 
testimony therein through a complete transcript 
thereof. 
 
Judge Alvarez was available to begin trial the same 
afternoon that Judge Citta declared a mistrial, or the 
following morning. Judge Alvarez could easily have become 
familiar with the transcript because she was present in the 
courtroom during parts of the trial, the transcript consisted 
only of 122 pages and the tape recording covered only three 
hours. The brute fact is that under Rule 1:12-3(b), Judge 
Alvarez could have been designated to complete the trial the 
next morning as easily as starting a second trial. 
 
The State argues that the district court had rational 
reasons for rejecting the alternatives to mistrial. The State 
suggests that the alternative of excusing the jury overnight 
was properly rejected because the court would not have 
been able to tell the jury how long the trial would be 
delayed. The State also argues that it would have been 
incongruous to substitute a new judge into a case in which 
another judge had made various evidentiary rulings, and 
that it would have been particularly inappropriate to 
substitute Judge Alvarez into a trial "mid-stream" because 
she was new to the bench. 
 
We are not impressed by these arguments. They do not 
make out a case of manifest necessity. A mistrial is not 
manifestly necessary when the testimony lasts less than 
one full day, and a judge who has observed part of the trial 
is available to resume the proceedings the next morning. As 
a matter of law, declaring a mistrial in this case was not 
manifestly necessary when the decision to declare a mistrial 
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vel non could have been postponed to the next morning. 
The delay would have given both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel, as well as the court, adequate time to 
consider alternative solutions to the sudden emergency. All 
judicial decisions should be based on calm deliberation. 
When it comes to decisions squarely implicating the serious 
consequences of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the necessity 
for collected and composed contemplation assumes a 
fortiori proportions. There was no legitimate reason for 
making the mistrial decision during a time of distraught 
distraction. The court could have easily rendered a decision 
the next morning through one of three judicial officers: the 
original trial judge, the presiding criminal court judge or 
the judge who presided at the second trial. At that time, the 
alternatives for aborting the trial or completing it with a 




Having concluded that the mistrial was not manifestly 
necessary, we now consider whether Love's counsel 
consented to the mistrial by failing to raise an objection. 
 
Mistrials declared with the defendant's consent do not 
bar later prosecution. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 
607 (1976). The courts of appeals have taken different 
approaches in determining whether defense counsel's 
failure to object to a mistrial constitutes implied consent. 
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
have adopted a rule that defendants give implied consent to 
a mistrial if they have an opportunity to object but fail to 
do so. See United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Nichols, 977 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 
1992); Camden v. Circuit Court, 892 F.2d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702, 705 (11th Cir. 
1987). At the other extreme, the Sixth and the Ninth 
Circuits refuse to infer consent without some positive 
manifestation of acquiescence by the defense. See, e.g., 
Glover v. McMackin, 950 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); 
Weston v. Kernan, 50 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 
Although this court has not decided the issue in 
ipsissimis verbis, the teachings of United States ex. rel. 
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Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1973), give 
persuasive direction. Russo involved a mistrial caused by 
jury deadlock. After the jury deliberated for several days 
without reaching a verdict, the judge called the jury to the 
courtroom and declared a mistrial without any advance 
notice to counsel. The defendant was retried and convicted. 
When we received the case on appeal from a grant of 
federal habeas corpus relief, we held that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibited a second trial. On the question 
of implied consent, we said: 
 
While the better practice may be to object as soon as 
counsel learns that a mistrial is to be granted, 
appellant's counsel was in a difficult situation. He had 
no advance warning or notice that a mistrial was to be 
declared . . . The Supreme Court's conclusion in United 
States v. Jorn may also be applicable in this situation: 
 
`. . . [I]ndeed, the trial judge acted so abruptly in 
discharging the jury that, had the prosecutor been 
disposed to suggest a continuance, or the defendant 
to object to the discharge of the jury, there would 
have been no opportunity to do so.' 
 
Also, to have objected in front of the jury might have 
prejudiced appellant for trying to "show up" the trial 
judge, especially if some members of the jury actually 
wanted to go home despite their civic obligation. In this 
situation, we cannot penalize appellant for failing to 
object sooner. 
 
Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
 
It is clear from our holding in Russo that we will not infer 
consent from defense counsel's silence unless there was 
some opportunity to object. What constitutes adequate 
opportunity, however, is a question which we must decide 
here. Love contends that his counsel did not have a 
meaningful opportunity to object because of the 
"emotionally charged atmosphere of the courtroom." 
 
Given the constitutional dimension of a double jeopardy 
violation, we must proceed with caution in inferring 
consent from counsel's failure to object. Our previously 
stated admonition reminds us that close cases regarding 
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the propriety of a mistrial "should be resolved in favor of 
the liberty of a citizen." Russo, 483 F.2d at 17. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
Love's counsel did not have a meaningful opportunity to 
object to the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial. First, the 
judge made no inquiry of counsel regarding the propriety of 
a mistrial. He did not invite their comments or ask them to 
propose alternatives. Cf. United States v. Buljubasic, 808 
F.2d 1260, 1265-1266 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If a judge should 
say: `I think a mistrial would be a good idea, but think this 
over and let me know if you disagree', the defendant's 
silence would be assent."). 
 
Second, the judge returned to the courtroom to declare a 
mistrial only five or ten minutes after informing counsel of 
his intent to do so. In other circumstances, this window of 
time might be adequate. In this case, however, given the 
suddenness of the mistrial declaration and the hectic 
atmosphere surrounding the proceedings, the brief period 
of time afforded little meaningful opportunity for thoughtful 
and reflective decision-making. 
 
Third, when the judge declared the mistrial and 
dismissed the jury, he immediately returned to his 
chambers and quickly left the courthouse. The judge's swift 
departure did not afford a reasonable opportunity to raise 
an objection. See United States v. Bates, 917 F.2d 388, 393 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding no consent where judge declared a 
mistrial, left the courtroom and ignored defendant's request 
for a sidebar); Lovinger v. Circuit Court, 845 F.2d 739, 744 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("It appears from the record that the judge 
actually left the courtroom as he finished his statement. He 
was gone before the defense had any reasonable 
opportunity to consider the import of his statement and act 
upon it."). 
 
Fourth, the atmosphere of the proceedings would have 
made it difficult to object, even if it had occurred to defense 
counsel to do so. We agree with the district court's 
assessment: "although objecting to Judge Citta's mistrial 
declaration could have been accomplished with due care 
and respect, Judge Citta's grief and the urgency of his 
familial obligations made such a feat considerably more 
difficult." 944 F. Supp at 386-387. 
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After considering all the circumstances, we conclude that 
Love had no meaningful opportunity to object to the 
declaration of a mistrial. Accordingly, there was no implied 
consent. Because there was no manifest necessity to 
declare the mistrial, and no express or implied consent to 
the mistrial by the defendant, we perceive no exception to 
the Double Jeopardy Clause's requirement that an 
individual may not be subjected "to hazards of trial and 
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
 
We have considered all arguments presented by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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